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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DISCRIMINATION
IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED HOUSING:
THE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires
that:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.1
Section 602 of the Act 2 was enacted to enable federal agencies to
enforce this policy, and it authorizes them to issue rules and
regulations which, while consistent with the objectives of the
program authorizing the assistance, effectuate the provisions of
Section 601.3 To enforce these regulations, an agency may termi-
nate assistance to noncomplying programs, or use any other
means authorized by law.4
Although fund terminations under Title VI have been used
frequently by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) in attempts to enforce school desegregation orders5 and
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
to prevent local public housing authorities (LHAs) from dis-
criminating on the basis of race in administering programs receiv-
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
242 U.S.C. § 2000d- 1 (1970).
3 Id. The applicable portion of the Act states:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant. loan.
or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and
directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect
to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of
the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the
action is taken.
4 Id. The applicable portion of the Act states:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be
effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance
under such program or activity . . . or (2) by any other means authorized by
law: Provided, however, that no such action shall be taken until the depart-
ment or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of
the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that com-
pliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.
5U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. HEW AND TITLE VI at 54-56 (1970).
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ing federal financial assistance, 6 under the Nixon administration,
fund terminations have been only rarely used as an administrative
enforcement mechanism under Title VI. 7 As a result, judges have
been forced to decide whether they should order a termination of
funds to a program that continues to receive federal financial
assistance even though it is being administered in a manner that
violates Title VI.
This question has been raised recently in the school desegrega-
tion field. In Adams v. Richardson,8 the court found that HEW
had not properly fulfilled its obligations under Title VI. 9 To rem-
edy this situation, the court ordered HEW to begin termination of
financial assistance to the 116 noncompliant school districts.
HEW was also directed to ask eighty-five school systems to
explain statistics that indicated racial discrimination. 10
However, in the housing field, the courts have not yet deter-
mined whether termination of federal assistance should be or-
dered in cases involving programs violating Title VI standards.
To provide an answer to this question the following issues must
be addressed: First, if a program is not in compliance with the
Title VI nondiscrimination requirements, is the federal agency in
charge of funding that program required to terminate financial
assistance?11 If so, the courts should not hesitate to order a
termination of federal funding. Second, if the agencies are not
obligated to terminate financial assistance to a discriminating proj-
ect, should the courts ever interfere with agency discretion and
order a fund termination? 12 Finally, if federal agencies are not
required to end the funding of discriminatory projects, and it is
determined that the courts should, in some cases, order fund
terminations, at what point should a court order a fund termina-
tion to remedy the discrimination found in the project?13 In other
6 For instance, during fiscal year 1970. HUD's Office of Equal Opportunity carried out
72 compliance reviews. HUD ANN. REP. 114 (1970).
7See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 17. 1973. at 14. col. 8. From 1964 to early 1970. HEW's
Office of Civil Rights terminated aid or threatened to terminate it in about 100 school
districts each year. Since 1970. no cut-offs have been made.
8351 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972). See notes 20-23 and accompanying text inffra.
91d. at 638-39. HEW admitted that seventy-four elementary and secondary school
districts were out of compliance with Section 601. but HEW had commenced adminis-
trative enforcement actions against only seven of them; another forty-two districts were
presumptively in violation of Supreme Court desegregation standards and HEW had done
nothing but review them. Eighty-five districts had one or more schools with substantially
disproportionate racial composition. but HEW had not required them to justify the dis-
proportion.
10 N.Y. Times. Apr. 17, 1973, at 13. col. 1.
11 See notes 15-44 and accompanying text infra.
12 See notes 45-49 and accompanying text infra.
13 See notes 50- 129 and accompanying text infra.
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words, what is the extent of agency discretion in determining the
appropriate remedy for a federally funded project that is being
administered in a discriminatory manner? Answers to these ques-
tions should permit the development of guidelines for judges faced
with agency refusal to terminate assistance, and thus forced to
decide whether the court should order terminations. 14
I. Is HUD REQUIRED TO TERMINATE FUNDS
TO A DISCRIMINATORY PROJECT?
An examination of the provisions of Title VI and their legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress intended fund termination to
be used as a remedy against discrimination in federally funded
projects only after all other means of obtaining compliance with
Title VI failed. 15 Section 602 clearly demonstrates a congression-
al preference for voluntary compliance over the more drastic
remedy of fund terminations.' 6 This emphasis on voluntary com-
pliance shows that Congress wanted fund terminations to be used
as a remedy for discrimination only as a last resort. Fund termina-
tions are disfavored because such cut-offs directly oppose another
congressional policy-carrying out the programs for which the
funds were granted originally.' 7 Section 602 reflects this conflict
since it requires that regulations devised to effectuate Section 60 1
"be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance,"' 18 and imposes further proce-
14 See notes 130-31 and accompanying text infra.
15Contra, Board of Pub. Instruction v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir. 1969).
See notes 16-42 and accompanying text infra.
16 Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970). See text of statute. supra note
4. The legislative history of Title VI reveals the emphasis on voluntary compliance.
Generally, we believe that compliance with the provisions of Title VI can be
accomplished through the application of persuasion and common sense. In
1962, for example, 11 colleges and universities in the South, rather than face
the loss of assistance, agreed to admit qualified Negroes to summer courses
which were financed under the National Defense Education Act.
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2512. Further. in Adams v. Richardson, 351
F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972). it was pointed out that "The underlying thrust of the statute
requires that the agency involved ... attempt at the outset to secure compliance by
voluntary means, if such method is reasonably possible. This course involves negotia-
tion .... " Id. at 641.
17 In the debate of Title VI, Senator Pastore outlined the reasons for disfavoring the
fund terminations:
[The] purpose of Title VI is not to cut off funds, but to end racial
discrimination.... As a general rule, cutoff of funds would not be consistent
with the objective of the Federal assistance statutes if other effective means
of ending discrimination are available ....
Section 602, by authorizing the agency to achieve compliance "by other
means authorized by law." encourages agencies to find ways to end dis-
crimination without refusing or terminating assistance.
110 CONG. REC. 7063 (1964).
18 Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970).
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dural requirements that must be met before funds may be termi-
nated. 19
However, the emphasis on voluntary compliance does not
leave HUD unlimited discretion. In Adams v. Richardson,20 a
suit was brought for declaratory relief against HEW, alleging that
HEW had failed to enforce Title VI against Southern school
districts. HEW defended by claiming that it was attempting to
bring about voluntary compliance with Title VI. The court in-
dicated that HEW had some discretion in the enforcement of Title
VI, but sole reliance on voluntary compliance was not sufficient. 2 '
Therefore, the court ordered HEW to send notices of compliance
hearings to 116 elementary and secondary school districts. 22
Thus, while affirming that emphasis on voluntary compliance is an
indication of agency discretion, Adams limits such discretion.
However, the court did not say that an agency's discretion was so
limited that a court should require it to terminate funds. Rather,
an agency's discretion is limited such that attempts to bring about
compliance by voluntary means alone are insufficient. Possible
additional compliance-seeking requirements are not made clear,
though it appears that an agency could fulfill its duty by referring
a case to the Department of Justice for judicial action, even if the
agency refrained from terminating funds. 23
Lending further support to the congressional preference for
remedies other than fund terminations is statutory language stat-
ing that the agency involved "may" terminate funds. 24 The Senate
floor debate on Title VI indicated that the use of the word "may"
19 Id. For example, there must be an opportunity for a hearing. Also, any termination
must be
limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as
to whom such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the
particular program. or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so
found.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970). Furthermore, in the event that funds are actually cut off by
the agency, the head of the federal department or agency which terminates the funding
must file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over
the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds
for such action.
20 351 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972).
21 Id. The court stated:
Where a substantial period of time has elapsed, during which periodic at-
tempts toward voluntary compliance have been either not attempted or have
been unsuccessful or have been rejected. defendants' limited discretion is
ended and they have a duty to effectuate the provisions of [§ 601] by either
administrative determination ... that funds should be terminated, or by any
other means authorized by law. such as reference to the Department of
Justice.
351 F. Supp. at 64 1.
22 N.Y. Times. Apr. 17, 1973, at 13. col. 1.23 See notes 27-35 and accompanying text infra.24 Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
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was intended to encourage agencies to devise their own methods
of enforcing the standards of Title VI, and thereby to avoid fund
terminations if possible. 25
A final argument supporting the interpretation that Congress
envisioned fund terminations as only one of several remedies for
discriminatory administration of federally funded projects is that
the congressional enumeration of remedies includes the phrase
"by any other means authorized by law." 26 "Other means" are
presently well defined as a result of past utilization of this ap-
proach. One alternative means is to seek an injunction which
compels compliance subject to a contempt citation. 27 Once an
injunction is obtained, it should, in many instances, more
effectively carry out the intent of Congress than would a fund
termination. The injunctive remedy is more consistent with the
achievement of the goals of the statute authorizing the financial
assistance. While a contempt citation for refusing to obey an
injunction penalizes the public officials involved, fund termina-
tions penalize the beneficiaries of assistance programs. For in-
stance, in July, 1969, when HEW ceased using Title VI termina-
tions as its chief weapon to bring about school desegregation,
3 percent of the school districts under HEW jurisdiction had been
declared ineligible for federal aid. 28 By using an anti-segregation
injunction, courts can often avoid such hardship29 to beneficiaries
25 For instance, according to Senator Gore: "As I have previously indicated in the
Senate, it seemed clear to me that the use of the word 'may' would have the effect of
authorizing alternate methods of implementing the provisions of Section 601." 110 CONG.
REC. 13126 (1964).
2642 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970).27 This alternative was suggested by Senator Pastore at 110 CONG. REC. 7061 (1964):
[I] suppose that once Title VI was enacted, in that particular case [in which
there was discrimination in one particular part of a state but not elsewhere] it
would still be proper for the Attorney General under other titles of this bill, if
he were asked to do so. to step in. He might go before the court and obtain
some kind of injunctive relief or some kind of mandatory relief which would
compel compliance subject to a citation for contempt of court.28 This is in spite of the facts that until 1968 "free choice" plans were all that HEW
required, and that HEW had been negotiating for compliance with such plans since 1965.
However, it should be noted that the districts which had been declared ineligible were
generally districts receiving only token amounts of federal assistance. SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (WALTER MONDALE, CHMN.), TOWARD
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, REP. No. 92-000. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 194-98
(1972) [hereinafter cited as MONDALE].
Beneficiaries of federal housing aid have also suffered from fund terminations. In
Philadelphia, where the court in Shannon v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban
Development, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), enjoined federal financial assistance to a
housing project, the white community's and the city government's resistance to federally
subsidized low- and moderate-income housing outside areas of minority concentration in
Philadelphia began to cause federally subsidized housing programs in the city to close
down. Maxwell. HUD's Project Selection Criteria-A Cure for "Impermissible Color
Blindness?" 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 102, 102-03 (1972).
29 Even if injunctions are used, beneficiaries may suffer. In Chicago. the LHA has built
no new public housing since 1969 when construction of such housing in black areas of the
city was enjoined. Maxwell. supra note 28. at 102. The situation became so desperate that
FALL 19731
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by accompanying the injunction with a court order requiring the
relevant federal agency to re-institute the financial assistance that
had been terminated. 3 0
Injunctions also appear to be a particularly effective mechanism
for enforcing Title VI. For example, on July 3, 1969, the Attor-
ney General and the Secretary of HEW announced that the
primary responsibility for ultimate enforcement of school desegre-
gation would be shifted from the Title VI HEW compliance
mechanism to judicial action by the Department of Justice.31
Subsequently, the Justice Department instituted an aggressive
enforcement program.3 2 As a result of these efforts, plus those of
private plaintiffs, the percentage of black children attending ma-
jority white schools in eleven Southern states 33 rose from 18.4
percent in 1968 to 39.1 percent in September of 1970.34 Even
greater gains in faculty desegregation were achieved. 35
A second alternative to the use of Title VI fund terminations in
the housing field is the use of Project Selection Criteria,3 6 a set of
standards used by HUD to evaluate proposed housing projects in
order to determine which projects are eligible to receive federal
assistance.3 7 Criterion (2) is entitled "Minority Housing Opportu-
nities." 38 A "poor" rating on this, or any other criterion, vetoes a
housing proposal.3 9 If a proposal receives no "poor" ratings, it is
approvable, and may be funded if it meets other processing stan-
dards. 40 By scrupulous use of Criterion (2) ratings, potentially
Chicago leaders who had earlier sought the 1969 order, in 1972 sought the reversal of that
order. Chicago Tribune. Mar. 6. 1972, § I. at 10. col. 3. (The head of the Chicago
Southern Christian Leadership Conference asked that the order be reversed.); Chicago
Tribune. Apr. 5. 1972. § 1. at 1. col. 1. (The A.C.L.U. attorney who had filed the suit
leading to the 1969 order said he would agree to its elimination.).
30 For instance, this occurred in Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp.
291 (M.D. Ala. 1969). and in Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ.. 270 F. Supp. 859 (M.D.
Ala. 1967).
31 N.Y. Times. July 4. 1969. at 7. col. 2.
32 In instituting the enforcement program, "[t]he Justice Department filed statewide
desegregation suits in Georgia and Texas, initiated individual suits against roughly 50
school districts, and requested updated orders in numerous cases that had already been
filed." MONDALE, supra note 28, at 200.
33 Alabama. Arkansas. Florida. Georgia, Louisiana. Mississippi. North Carolina. South
Carolina, Tennessee. Texas. and Virginia.
34 MONDALE, supra note 28. at 200.
35 Id. at 198. 372.
3637 Fed. Reg. 203 (1972).
37 Maxwell. supra note 28. at 92.
38 A project is rated "superior" in this category if it will provide "opportunities for
minorities for housing outside existing areas of minority concentrations." or if the project
is located in "an area of minority concentration, but the area is part of an official State or
local agency development plan, and sufficient comparable opportunities exist for housing
for minority families ... outside areas of minority concentration." 37 Fed. Reg. 206
(1972). A project is rated "poor" if it will "cause a significant increase in proportion of
minority residents in an area which is not one of minority concentration, but which is
racially mixed..." or a similar adverse result. Id.
3937 Fed. Reg. 203 (1972).
40 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTATION
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discriminatory projects may be screened out before federal fund-
ing is approved.
When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 41 it
seems to have intended that the federal agencies required to
enforce the mandate of Section 60.1 not be obliged to terminate
immediately funds of projects found to be discriminatory. Rather,
the agency should seek voluntary compliance; 42 employ other
remedies, such as injunctions, against intransigent project admin-
istrators; 43 and encourage LHAs to refrain from discriminatory
acts by using Project Selection Criteria to give more aid to LHAs
having policies that best promote equal housing opportunities. 44
These alternative remedies more fully satisfy the dual congres-
sional aims of providing federal aid to locally administered hous-
ing projects for the poor, while assuring that such projects do not
reinforce the segregation lines already dividing major American
municipalities.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVELY
DETERMINED REMEDIES
Since fund terminations are not the statutorily favored form of
relief for discriminatory practices in federally assisted projects
and since federal agencies are given broad discretion to determine
appropriate remedies, the issue arises as to whether a court
should ever order an immediate termination of funds because of
discrimination. 45 Under the fourteenth amendment no government
program may be administered in a racially discriminatory man-
OF HUD PROJECT SELECTION CRITERIA FOR SUBSIDIZED HOUSING: AN EVALUATION, at
4 (1972). [Hereinafter cited as P.S.C. EVALUATION.] This evaluation covered 3,273
proposals for 226,530 housing units processed by HUD's seventy-seven Area and In-
suring Offices between February 7, and June 30, 1972. Id. at I. Only 313 housing
proposals were found to be in areas of minority concentration, and 17 percent of the
proposals in -such areas were rejected due to one or more "poor" ratings. Of the proposals
not in such areas, 12 percent were rejected. Id. at 58-60. However, the likelihood of an
"approvable" proposal being funded was slightly greater if the proposal was in an area of
minority concentration than if not, for 73 percent of the "approvable" projects in areas of
minority concentration were funded; 70 percent of the "approvable" projects outside such
areas were funded. Id. at 59.
4142 U.S.C. §2000d (1970).42 See notes 16-23 and accompanying text supra.
I See notes 27-35 and accompanying text supra.
44 See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
45 Judicial review of agency-devised remedies is explicitly authorized by statute. If there
is a fund termination, any person aggrieved thereby:
[M]ay obtain judicial review of such action ... and such action shall not be
deemed committed to unreviewable agency discretion ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1970). Other actions taken pursuant to § 602:
[Sihall be subject to such judicial review as may be otherwise provided by
law for similar action taken by such department or agency on other grounds.
Id. However, there are no specific provisions governing judicial review of an agency
refusal to terminate funds.
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ner.46 If the Constitution guarantees a right, such as the right to
nondiscriminatory administration of federally funded programs, it
also guarantees that courts will have the power to fashion an
effective remedy to protect that right.47 Therefore, if a federal
agency fails to protect diligently the constitutional rights of cit-
izens affected by a federally assisted project, courts may intervene
and fashion an appropriate remedy.
However, the fact that the Constitution guarantees a remedy
for a constitutional wrong does not mean that a particular remedy
is guaranteed. This follows from two sources. First, the school
desegregation cases clearly imply that there may be more than
one remedy sufficiently effective to satisfy constitutional require-
ments. 48 Second, cases indicate that when Congress has not de-
faulted on its obligation to assure protection of constitutional
rights, courts have been willing to accept the congressionally
devised remedy, rather than make one of their own. 49
From this it follows that if a program is discriminatory, an
aggrieved party has the constitutional right to have the condition
remedied, but he has no constitutional right to a fund termination.
Nevertheless, the guarantee of some remedy for constitutional
wrongs constitutes a limitation on federal agency discretion in
determining appropriate remedies for discriminatory actions. The
agency must devise an effective remedy designed to alleviate the
discrimination which presently exists or the courts will interfere
with the normal agency discretion and order an appropriate rem-
edy.
46 See Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956);
Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis. 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 296 F. Sipp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
47 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1.25 (1971).48 Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S 430 (1968), held that the "freedom-of-choice" plan of
the local school board did not adequately meet its duty to develop a plan to eliminate
promptly and effectively the dual system of education. Nevertheless, the Court indicated
that such a plan would have been acceptable if it had proven effective. 391 U.S. at 440.
Though the Court indicated that a "freedom of choice" would not be acceptable if other
more effective means of bringing about desegregation were reasonably available, 391 U.S.
at 441, it did indicate that: "There is no universal answer to complex problems of
desegregation; there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case." 391 U.S.
at 439. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), where
the Court indicated that judicial authority was invoked to provide a desegregation remedy
only because the local school authorities had failed to devise their own satisfactory
policies. 402 U.S. at 415- 16.4 9 The first indication of this occurred in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 383 U.S. 641 (1966), in
which the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74(e) (1970), insofar as it overruled parts of a New York election law.
By enfranchising certain Puerto Ricans in New York City, the Act was found to have
involved Congress in what was traditionally a court task-defining and remedying
fourteenth amendment equal protection rights. The Court acquiesced to this Act instead of
making a de novo determination of what the fourteenth amendment required. The reason
for this acquiescence can be traced to Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. This Section
[VoL.7:135
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Thus there appears to be a conflict between the role of courts
and that of federal agencies in determining proper remedies for
discrimination in federally assisted housing projects. On the one
hand, the provisions of Title VI grant wide discretion to federal
agencies in this endeavor. On the other hand, there is a con-
stitutionally guaranteed remedy for discriminatory administration
of federally assisted projects, which must be enforced by the
courts. The problem is to determine the scope of the discretion
granted federal agencies by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
III. GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
When a court hears a suit alleging discrimination, it has broad
equitable power to devise an appropriate remedy.50 However,
federal agencies also have the responsibility to cure discrimination
in the programs they fund.51 Difficulties arise since courts and
agencies share the responsibility to combat discrimination. This
conflict is best discussed in terms of the scope of judicial review
of HUD actions. The broader the scope of review, the greater the
responsibility assumed by the court as compared to the agency.
A. Is There Discrimination?
The first question confronting a court reviewing HUD actions
is the validity of HUD's determination as to whether federal
funds are being used in a discriminatory manner. A court nor-
gives Congress the power to enforce the equal protection and due process rights guaran-
teed under Section I of the Amendment. However, the Voting Rights Act did more than
enforce fourteenth amendment rights; it defined certain of these rights by outlining what
literacy requirements a state could impose on would-be voters. The Court deferred to this
congressional action because Congress "brought a specially informed legislative com-
petence" to its "general appraisal of literacy requirements for voting." 383 U.S. at 655-56.
The Court felt, "it is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which Congress
might resolve the conflicts as it did." 383 U.S. at 653, Another case dealing with the
Voting Rights Act, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). dealt more
specifically with what Congress could do to enforce constitutional rights, rather than with
what Congress could do to define constitutional rights. The specific issue was whether
Congress had the power to enforce the fifteenth amendment's guarantee that "the rights of
the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Section 2 of the
fifteenth amendment grants Congress enforcement power in language virtually identical to
that of Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. On that basis, the Court found that
Congress had "full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against
racial discrimination in voting." 383 U.S. at 326, and specifically rejected the argument
that "the task of fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities
must necessarily be left entirely to the court." 383 U.S. at 327. For a thorough discussion
of these issues see Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and Congressional Power, 81 YALE L.J.
1542, 1560-62 (1972).5 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
51 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970).
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mally freely reviews questions of law, but limits itself in reviewing
findings of facts.52 Applying a reasonableness test, a court accepts
administrative determinations of factual issues, if they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence, rather than making independent
determinations of their validity.5 3
From this it follows that if a program is discriminatory, an
aggrieved party has the constitutional right to have the condition
remedied, but he has no constitutional right to a fund termination.
Nevertheless, the guarantee of some remedy for constitutional
wrongs constitutes a limitation on federal agency discretion in
determining appropriate remedies for discriminatory actions. The
agency must devise an effective remedy designed to alleviate the
discrimination which presently exists or the courts will interfere
Whether a certain act constitutes discrimination is a "mixed"
question of law and fact. For that reason, it would be fruitless to
try to determine the scope of judicial review of an agency determi-
nation of whether there is discrimination by deciding whether the
question is more nearly legal or factual. Rather, the courts, in
determining the scope of review they will follow when reviewing
agency determinations, have tended to use what one commentator
has called the "practical approach." '54 Courts first look at the
competing policy considerations behind the various degrees of
review available. Then, deciding as a matter of policy whether the
review should be broad or narrow, they apply the label of "fact"
or "law" to the issue at hand. 55 Thus, in order to determine the
scope of judicial review of a HUD determination concerning
whether discrimination exists, the various policies or factors con-
sidered by courts must be examined.
One factor which is relevant in deciding the proper degree of
judicial review is the nature of the question raised. Generally,
courts will broadly review agency decisions when propositions or
methods of approach are at issue, but will narrow the scope of
review if an agency is merely applying such propositions or meth-
ods to unique facts.56 Thus, a reviewing court makes an in-
dependent judgment on the general principles determining what
constitutes discrimination, while, in applying these principles to a
particular situation, it defers more to the relevant agency.
This principle is illustrated in cases involving Title VI. For
instance, in Shannon v. United States Department of Housing
524 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 29.01 (1958).
53 W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 361 (5th ed. 1970).
544 K. DAvIS, supra note 52, at § 30.02.
55 Id.
56 Id. at § 30.11.
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and Urban Development,57 the court outlined the general criteria
by which HUD should judge whether an LHA had conformed to
the requirements of Title VI.5 8 The court then remanded the case
to HUD to make a determination of whether the particular proj-
ect in question was in conformity.5 9 Similarly, in Adams v. Rich-
ardson,60 when HEW was found to have failed to enforce ade-
quately the school desegregation requirements of the Con-
stitution, the reviewing court enunciated the general principle that
HEW, by its total reliance on voluntary compliance, could not
fulfill its statutory obligation to prevent the use of federal funds by
segregated school systems. 61 However, the court itself did not
apply this principle to any particular school system. Rather, it
ordered HEW to begin compliance hearings for 116 elementary
and secondary school districts. 62 At compliance hearings, HEW
has the power to devise any remedy it believes appropriate to the
situation. 63
Other factors may dictate a broad scope of judicial review of
agency determinations concerning the existence of discrim-
ination, even when such a determination focuses only on a par-
ticular situation. A court must consider the nature of the problem
confronting the administrative agency. 64 In more important con-
troversies, judicial review should be broader.65 Where con-
stitutional rights are at stake, as they are in Title VI fund termina-
tion disputes, the scope of review should be quite broad. 66
The fact that constitutional rights are at stake does not neces-
sarily mean that the scope of judicial review is so broad that the
57436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
58436 F.2d at 821.
59 Id. at 822-23. However, the court of appeals did undertake some remedial action of
its own; it terminated federal financial assistance to the project under consideration until
HUD made its determination. Furthermore, it reserved to the district court the right to
review H U D's determination.
60 351 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972).6 1 Id. at 641.
62 N.Y. Times. Apr. 17. 1973. at 13. col. I.
6 See 45 C.F.R. §702 (1972).
64 REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE 91 (1941).
6 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 585 (1965).
66 In Pickering v. Board of Educ.. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). the Supreme Court indicated
that:
This Court has regularly held that where constitutional rights are an issue an
independent examination of the record will be made in order that the con-
trolling legal principles may be applied to the actual facts of the case.
391 U.S. at 578. n.2. Similarly in Jacobellis v. Ohio. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Mr. Justice
Brennan said that in obscenity cases. as in all cases involving first amendment rights, the
Court "cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts." Id. at
190. To this he added a footnote: "Even in judicial review of administrative agency
determinations, questions of 'constitutional fact' have been held to require de novo re-
view." 378 U.S. at 190. n.6.
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reviewing court must make an independent judgment.6 7 This con-
clusion follows because an entire series of factors must be taken
into account before a definitive solution is revealed. 68 For in-
stance, there have been cases involving constitutional rights in
which courts have not felt compelled to review fully agency
determinations.69 Nevertheless, other factors do not indicate that
the judicial review of HUD's findings as to the existence of
discrimination should be narrowed. One important consideration
not yet mentioned is the comparative qualifications of the agency
and a court to decide this particular issue.70 In the field of race
relations the courts generally hold that they, not the agencies,
possess greater expertise.
Thus an analysis of the various factors commonly considered
by courts in determining the appropriate scope of judicial review
in a given case reveals that when reviewing an agency determina-
tion of whether discrimination exists in a particular federally
funded project, the court should thoroughly review the adminis-
trative finding. On a scale from "complete unreviewability to
complete substitution of judicial judgment," 71 the review of an
agency finding regarding discrimination should be nearer the lat-
ter.
B. Review of HUD Remedial Actions
If a court finds discrimination in the administration of federally
funded projects, it must review the remedial action, if any, taken
by HUD. The test applied to remedies is whether they are
sufficiently effective to cure the constitutional wrong. 72 A review-
67 This assertion assumes that the "constitutional fact" doctrine is no longer good law.
Under that doctrine, findings by administrative agencies of facts decisive of constitutional
issues must be weighed independently in the course of judicial review or be determined
totally independently by the reviewing court. Strong. The Persistent Doctrine of "Con-
stitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REv.223 (1968). Many commentators believe this doctrine is
in a state of decay. W. GELLHORN & C. BvsE, supra note 53, at 366. To Professor Jaffe,
the question of whether the constitutional fact doctrine is still good law remains open. L.
JAFFE, supra note 65, at 651. Professor Davis is sure it is not good law. K. DAVIS, supra
note 52, at § 29.09 (Supp. 1970). Professor Strong asserts that the doctrine is still viable.
Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact,"46 N.C.L. REV. 223 (1968).
684 K. DAVIS, supra note 67; REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCE-
DURE 91 (1941). See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra.
69 Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940); Railroad
Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941); Federal Power Comm'n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). In these cases the court refused to review
agency action that was alleged to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
704 K. DAvIs,supra note 52. at § 30.09.
71 Id. at § 29.01.
72 Cf. note 47 and accompanying text supra.
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ing court must independently determine the degree of remedial
effectiveness required to meet constitutional standards, since the
judiciary is peculiarly suited to decide issues of general legal
principles and constitutionality. 73 Nevertheless, the scope of re-
view of a determination that a particular remedy satisfies this
general standard need not be so broad. 74 To determine the proper
scope of review, it is necessary to examine the competing policies
calling for various degrees of review. 75 These policy consid-
erations are analyzed below.
1. Congressional Intent-Courts narrow the scope of their re-
view if Congress committed remedy formulation to the agency.7 6
As previously noted,77 in Title VI cases administrative discretion
is intentionally substantial. Because of this legislative intent,
courts should give substantial deference to administrative rem-
edies.
Section 603 of Title V1 78 defines the scope of judicial review
for agency actions taken under Section 602. If there is a fund
termination, any person aggrieved thereby: "[M]ay obtain judicial
review of such action ... and such action will not be deemed
committed to unreviewable agency discretion. . . .. 79 Other ac-
tions taken pursuant to Section 602: "[S]hall be subject to such
judicial review as may be otherwise provided by law for similar
action taken by such department or agency on other grounds."80
Thus, Title VI contains no express provisions defining the scope
of review if the agency fails to terminate funds. However, Section
602 does contain hints about the proper scope of review. First,
the language of Title VI-that funds "may" be termi-
nated-indicates that Congress intended to give agencies some
discretion in deciding whether to use a fund termination to
effectuate the policies of Section 601.1 Second, the emphasis on
voluntary compliance also indicates the congressional preference
for agency, rather than judicial, handling of the enforcement of
Title V I. Clearly, "voluntary compliance" would more likely refer
to negotiations between federal and local officials regarding how
the local community can best go about conducting a satisfactory
73 See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
74 Id.
71 See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra.
764 K. DAVIS, supra note 52. at § 30.10.
77 See notes 16-44 and accompanying text supra.
7842 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1970).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
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program, than to a court-ordered fund termination.8 2 Nonetheless,
as mentioned earlier, the emphasis on voluntary compliance does
not leave HUD with unlimited discretion. a 3 Third, at least one
case seems to indicate that the enactment of Title VI limited
judicial flexibility in devising housing discrimination remedies.
That is, the limits on Title VI administrative enforcement activity
also apply to courts. In Gautreaux v. Romney,8 4 a federal district
court enjoined HUD from making Model Cities money available
to the City of Chicago because Chicago had failed to comply with
a condition under which it had received earlier Model Cities
money. The condition was an agreement to build public housing in
non-ghetto areas. The Model Cities program itself had not been
shown to be discriminatory, as and Section 602 had been in-
terpreted as limiting administrative agencies to terminating funds
only to programs which had been found discriminatory. 6 When
the case reached the court of appeals, determination of the fund
cut-off issue depended in large measure on whether the limits
Congress had put on agency action under Title VI also limited
court action. The court of appeals held that such limits should
apply to equitable remedies devised by courts, and reversed the
district court decision.8 7 Thus, the limits on permissible remedies
for enforcing the policy of Title VI apply equally to administrative
and judicial remedies. 88
82 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
81 See notes 20- 23 and accompanying text supra.
4332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
85 Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124. 126 (7th Cir. 1972).
6 Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). In this case, an
HEW order ending funding grants for three programs under three different statutes was
vacated for not being limited to a particular program. The fact that all three programs gave
financial assistance to the Taylor County, Florida, school system which, according to
HEW, was making inadequate progress toward desegregation, was not sufficient to justify
a fund termination en masse. Each program had to be considered separately to determine if
it were discriminatory, even though a program need not be "considered in isolation from
its context." 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79. This limitation was derived from the admonition in
Section 602 of Title VI that the termination of assistance "shall be limited to the ...
recipient as to whom such a finding [of non-compliance with Section 601] has been made
and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which
non-compliance has been so found .. " Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I
(1970).
87 457 F.2d at 127. The court stated: "We think it was improper for the District Court
to threaten the termination of a program which was not tainted with discriminatory action
in order to bring about a cure of a separate program which was found to be so tainted." Id.
88Judge Sprecher, in his dissenting opinion, argued persuasively that Section 602 does
not limit the equitable remedies of a court. First, he said that the Supreme Court in Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17 (1971), had analyzed restrictive
language similar to that in Section 602 and had found no suggestion of an intention to
restrict the existing powers of the federal courts to enforce the equal protection clause or
withdraw from courts their historic equitable remedial powers. 457 F.2d at 135 (dissenting
opinion). Second. the equitable powers of the courts exist independently of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 880
(5th Cir. 1966). These powers are based not only on the Constitution, but on the Civil
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While the result in Gautreaux does not speak directly to the
scope of judicial review, it indicates that Title VI was intended to
limit judicial discretion in enforcement. If Congress intended to
limit court discretion, the language of Title VI and its emphasis on
voluntary compliance are strong evidence that Congress intended
agency discretion to be broad.
2. The Importance of the Rights at Stake-The fact that con-
stitutional rights are at stake when HUD attempts to remedy
violations of Title V18 9 urges a broader scope of judicial review.90
However, even when constitutional rights are involved, federal
courts have been willing to give "great weight" to remedies pro-
posed by administrative agencies. For example, in United States
v. Jefferson County Board of Education,91 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals decided that, in determining whether to approve a
school desegregation plan, it would give "great weight" to the
guidelines for school desegregation promulgated by HEW. 92 Sim-
ilarly, in ruling on the constitutionality of a school desegregation
plan, Justice Blackmun, then a judge of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, ruled that HEW guidelines, although not binding on
the courts, were entitled to "serious judicial deference." 93
Unfortunately, neither court defined what was meant by "great
weight," or "serious judicial deference." Furthermore, neither
term has a familiar legal meaning. 94 Nevertheless, these cases
indicate that even if fourteenth amendment rights are at stake, the
scope of judicial review may be somewhat limited.
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970), and the Exec. Order No. 11063. 3
C.F.R. 652.42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). which also support court powers to act to promote
fair housing, 457 F.2d at 134-35 (dissenting opinion). Third, "The legislative history [of
Section 602] ... makes perfectly clear that the requirements of the statute are directed
exclusively at the administrative agency." Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d
1068, 1076, n.13 (5th Cir. 1969). quoted in 457 F.2d at 135, n.10,
Nevertheless. it would seem unlikely that Congress would want courts to take actions
that the courts specifically forbid agencies to take. Even if the courts are not specifically
bound to the limits set by Title VI. it would seem that their equitable discretion should be
exercised in a manner consistent with congressional policy. As the majority in Gautreaux
indicated, the limits set by Congress on fund terminations were necessary to protect the
innocent beneficiaries of the programs that were the targets of fund cut-offs. 457 F.2d at
128. This is hardly a policy the courts should ignore.
89 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
9 0 See notes 64-69 and accompanying text supra.
91 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). aff'd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.). cert. denied.
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
92 372 F.2d at 85 1. Accord, Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist.. 348
F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965).
93 Smith v. Board of Educ.. 365 F.2d 770. 780 (8th Cir. 1966).
9 The "great weight" given to agency determinations may be used regardless of the
ultimate standard of review. If a court is willing to accept all 'reasonable agency determi-
nations." the court will give "great weight" to an agency remedy. Jacob Siegel Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n. 327 U.S. 608. 613-14 (1946). Even if the court completely
reviews an agency decision and unhesitatingly substitutes its own judgment. it may give
"great weight" to the agency determination. 4 K. DAVIs. supra note 52. at § 30.13.
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This result is supported by a variety of factors. As mentioned
above, the fact that constitutional rights are at stake does not
necessarily mean that the scope of judicial review must be so
broad that the reviewing court makes an independent judgment. 95
This is especially true since the intent of Congress is that scope of
review be limited, 96 and since courts are often willing to defer to
Congress' judgment on how best to remedy a constitutional viola-
tion.9 7
If HUD refuses to terminate funds to a discriminatory LHA,
and a reviewing court, deferring to agency discretion, also re-
frains, this leads to the appearance of an unconstitutional result.
Such a conclusion would be erroneous, however, because there
are alternative methods for remedying the discriminatory actions
of LHAs. 98 HUD may, in fact, be vigorously implementing such
alternative remedies. Thus, even though both HUD and the
courts refuse to terminate funds to a discriminatorily administered
program, this need not mean that a violation of a constitutional
right is being tolerated. 99
3. HUD's Expertise-The most important factor affecting the
scope of review is the comparative qualifications of the agency
and those of the court to decide the particular issue. 100 As men-
tioned before, courts are considered the experts in the field of race
relations. 10 1 Yet, courts have recognized agency expertise in cer-
tain specific areas. For instance, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educa-
tion,102 explained the rationale for giving serious deference to the
HEW guidelines for school desegregation by observing that the
courts acting alone have failed to bring about desegregation, and
the guidelines, prepared in detail by experts in education and
school administration, present the best aid to the courts in eval-
uating the validity of a school desegregation plan. 10 3
In the field of housing discrimination, courts have tended to
criticize HUD not for its lack of expertise, but for not using its
expertise in planning projects so as to avoid increased racial
concentration. This attitude is illustrated in Shannon v. United
95 See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
9 6 See notes 76-88 and accompanying text supra.
97 See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
98 See notes 27-40 and accompanying text supra.
9 See notes 15-40 and accompanying text supra.
1004 K. DAVIS, supra note 52, at §30.09.
:
01 See note 70 and accompanying tcxt supra.
102372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.).cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
103 372 F.2d at 847.
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States Department of Housing and Urban Development. 10 4 In
that case, federal financial assistance to a rent supplement project
in Philadelphia was enjoined on the grounds that HUD had given
insufficient attention to the effect the project would have on racial
concentration in Philadelphia. 10 5 HUD is obligated, according to
the court, to exercise its expertise to determine the socio-
economic desirability of a housing project, and one of the mea-
sures of the project's desirability is the impact of the project on
racial segregation. 10 6
When HUD has used its expertise, courts have been willing to
approve its decisions, even when it has decided to locate a hous-
ing project in an area of minority concentration, thus increasing
such concentration. For instance, in Croskey Street Concerned
Citizens v. Romney,10 7 a district court refused to enjoin the con-
struction of a low-income housing project for the elderly in an
area of racial concentration in Philadelphia because HUD had
analyzed the impact of the building on racial concentration and
had acted to alleviate any harmful effects.' 08 Similarly, in Coffey
v. Romney,109 residents in the neighborhood of the proposed
project sought to prevent its approval by HUD primarily on the
ground that H U D
did not use 'adequate institutionalized means' for finding the
facts necessary to a determination of whether the [project
site] could be selected for federally financed housing in com-
pliance with the Department's duties under the Constitution
and Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968.110
104436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
105 436 F.2d at 8 11- 12.
106 The court held:
[Tihe Agency must utilize some institutionalized method whereby, in consid-
ering site selection or type selection, it has before it the relevant racial and
socio-economic information necessary for compliance with its duties under
the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts.
436 F.2d at 821.
However, there will be times when needs are so pressing that, projects that would increase
racial concentration should be approved, but HUD can do so only after taking into
account the socio-economic implications. 436 F.2d at 822. See Maxwell. HUD's Project
Selection Criteria-A Cure for "Impermissible Color Blindness?"48 NOTRE DAME LAW-
YER 92, 95-97 (1972).
107335 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Pa. 1971).aff'd, 450 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972).
108 The project was planned as part of a "package." The package included building
low-income housing outside of the areas of racial concentration, Further. HUD decided
that the only public housing it would approve at the site would be for the elderly because
there was evidence that in areas with a high concentration of racial minorities, projects for
the aged are more integrated than the surrounding community. Finally. HUD provided
that the housing units in black areas were to be scattered among four sites to avoid large
scale concentration of public housing in black areas. 335 F. Supp. at 1256.
109Civil No. C-44-G-71 (M.D.N.C. 1972). summarized in Maxwell. supra note 106. at
104.
"0 Id. at 2.
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The court, assuming that proper consideration of relevant factors
by HUD would entitle its determination to significant deference,
decided that HUD had properly weighed socio-economic factors,
particularly race, in approving the site and therefore the court
approved the location.
In devising desegregation guidelines HUD must follow two
directives. First, it must strive to maintain a comprehensive na-
tional housing assistance program. This goal requires a precise
analysis of the housing needs of the particular localities being
considered as possible sites for federal projects. This determina-
tion is peculiarly within the expertise of HUD."' Additionally, in
carrying out the policy of the Act, HUD must strive to make each
particular project successful. 112 Any reluctance to terminate funds
will significantly aid the achievement of this goal.11 3 Surely HUD,
given its intimate knowledge of the details of the various programs
under its control, is better able than the courts to balance the
competing goals of desegregation and of maintenance of federally
assisted programs.
Second, HUD must exercise its expertise to prevent dis-
crimination.1 4 The use of Project Selection Criteria 15 represents
an attempt to satisfy this requirement. HUD's processors of
financial assistance applications have been instructed to utilize the
experts available to them to evaluate each proposal properly. 1" 6
In twenty of the twenty-five HUD field offices, ratings on crite-
rion (2), minority housing opportunities, have been preceded by
recommendations from equal opportunity officers, the HUD spe-
cialists in preventing discrimination. 117 The seeming success of
these criteria in placing projects outside areas of minority concen-
tration' 18 appears to indicate that future judicial deference to
11 Rubinowitz, Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM, 625. 656 (1973).
11242 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970). See text of the Act supra note 2.
113 Fisher. The Carrot and the Stick: Conditions for Federal Assistance, 6 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 401. 405 (1969).114 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
115 See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
116 HPMC-FHA Circular 4400.4 (March 6, 1972), in P.S.C. EVALUATION, supra note
40, at 80.
117 P.S.C. EVALUATION, supra note 40, at 8 I. It has been recommended that courts rely
on the Equal Opportunity Office (EO) to formulate remedies for discrimination by LHAs.
First, the EO is not deeply involved in the original site selection process and thus can view
the project with more objectivity. Second, the EO is knowledgeable enough about accept-
able site requirements to qualify as a reliable expert. Note. Racial Discrimination in Public
Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV. 63 (1970).
118 In the first half of 1972, only about 10 percent of the reportedly rated proposals for
housing projects were found to be in areas of minority concentration. Proposals for
housing in areas of minority concentration were more likely ( 17 percent) to be rejected
than proposals not in such areas (12 percent). P.S.C. EVALUATION, supra note 40. at
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actions taken by HUD will be significant; the confidence won by
an agency's past performance affects the standard of review
courts use in judging the agency's actions.119
The desirability of deferring to agency expertise was illustrated
in the case of Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority.120 The
court ordered the Housing Authority to refrain from con-
centrating large numbers of dwelling units at one location.1 21
While such an order might aid in the dispersal of public housing to
many locations, it also would likely result in fewer units being
built, 12 2 since the cost per unit rises with decreasing individual
project size.' 23 Furthermore, the Gautreaux court had some
difficulty determining what would be the impact of low-income
projects placed in certain areas, and the court has been criticized
for relying on the plaintiff's brief for an answer. 124 It is, of course,
not surprising that a court would find itself faced with such prob-
lems when it deals in an area in which it lacks expertise.
In any event, courts have recognized the need for the use of
administrative expertise in devising remedies to cure dis-
criminatory practices of LHAs.125 It is apparent that HUD, the
agency responsible for the projects in question, has both the most
intimate knowledge of the projects and the most extensive exper-
ience in devising remedies for racial discrimination in its particu-
lar area. This lends further support to the principle that the courts
should grant considerable deference to agency-devised remedial
decisions.
4. Nature of Proceedings Before the Administrative Agency-
The scope of judicial review of agency action is also a function of
the nature of the proceedings before the agency.126 If an agency
decision is made after hearings conducted in conformity with the
Administrative Procedure Act, 127 a reviewing court is likely to
58-59. In past years the percentage of public housing sites found in minority areas has
been higher. A recent study found that in Chicago. San Francisco. and Oakland, over 70
percent of the total occupied units in each city were located in areas of 50 to 100 percent
black population. Note, supra note 117, at 85. 99, 113.
"9S9 ee, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE 91 (1941).
120 304 F. Supp.736 (N.D. III. 1969).
121 304 F. Supp. at 739.
122 Note, Discriminatory Site Selection in Public Housing and Federal Judicial Re-
sponse, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 720, 733 (1970).
123 Smaller projects require the acquisition of more sites, resulting in an increased total
expenditure. Ledbetter. Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 490, 502 (1967).
124 Note. 85 HARV. L. REV. 870. 878 n.45 (1972).
125 Shannon v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, 436 F.2d 809
(3d Cir. 1970); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
126 REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE91 (1941).
1275 U.S.C. §§ 500-76 (1970). This act gives all interested parties the right to present
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grant more deference to the resulting agency decision than if the
agency had proceeded otherwise. Thus, if HUD acts to eliminate
discrimination after conducting a compliance hearing, 128 a review-
ing court will be more inclined to defer to the anti-discrimination
remedy HUD chooses. However, if HUD limits its analysis and
remedial actions to the use of Project Selection Criteria, the scope
of review will be greater, even though these criteria appear to
satisfy the Shannon mandate that HUD adopt institutionalized
means for achieving compliance with Title VI.129
IV. DEFINING A STANDARD OF REVIEW
The above survey of the factors affecting the standard of re-
view of HUD's remedial actions under Title VI makes possible a
more precise statement of the proper scope of judicial review of
such actions. The reasonableness test,1 3 0 which requires a court
to uphold an agency decision if it can be said to be "reasonable,"
provides the clearest and most workable standard of review. The
factors analyzed above tend to support this theory of narrow
review. 13 1
Of course, the scope of judicial review within the reason-
ableness standard will fluctuate, for many of the factors which
affect the scope of judicial review will vary from case to case. For
instance, in some cases HUD may make full use of its expertise
to devise remedies, while in others it may rely too heavily on
voluntary compliance. In some cases HUD may devise a remedy
after holding formal hearings, or, in other cases, its procedure may
be cursory.
It appears that courts, in the absence of special circumstances,
should give considerable deference to HUD in developing work-
able and effective remedies against housing discrimination.
Through adherence to such a policy, the courts can assure that a
comprehensive national housing finance program will continue to
flourish and that discrimination in the administration of housing
programs will be reduced to a minimum. It is beyond doubt that
the achievement of these dual goals was intended by Congress
when it enacted Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
-Barry M. Block
evidence (id. § 554), guarantees that all parties required to appear before the agency are
entitled to representation by counsel (id. § 555), and prohibits the admission of immaterial
evidence (id. § 556).12 8The procedure for a compliance hearing is governed by 24 C.F.R. § 1.9 (1972),
which indicates that the hearing will be conducted in conformity with the Administrative
Procedure Act,
129 See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
13 0 See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
131 See notes 72- 129 and accompanying text supra.
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